The last twenty years have seen a remarkable change in public and institutional support for Breton language promotion. Language activists who had previously resisted and opposed the actions of the French state are now to the fore in designing and implementing institutional language policies to promote Breton, particularly in schooling, adult learning, media, arts and the public space. Spolsky (2003) usefully distinguishes between policies aimed at "revital ization" in home language acquisition and usage (notably in educational policy) and "regeneration" in activities in wider society. This paper concentrates on the regeneration efforts exemplified by the Ya d'ar Brezhoneg program for local language plans, drawing on qualitative interview data from Breton language pro fessionals and employees of Ofis ar Brezhoneg , the Region's Breton language pro motion agency.
Introduction
Brittany's Regional Council adopted a document entitled Une Politique Linguistique pour la Bretagne ('A language policy for Brittany') on 17 December 2004. It defined broad aims to support and develop Breton and Gallo and set the agenda for officializing language policy. The political majority in the Regional Council was a socialistled alliance that was reelected in 2010, including new figures from the Breton language movement in its ranks, but the policy was accepted by unanimous vote in full session. Ways to productively implement language policy in favor of Breton, rather than any opposition to it, were among the themes of the political campaigns for the March 2010 regional elections (Broudic 2010a ). This consensus among elected politicians reflects wide support among the gen eral population for the language promotion project. That support, however ill defined, represents a sharp turnaround in both openly expressed and implicit public opinion in the last fifteen to twenty years, not least among Breton speakers themselves. A much more detailed policy proposal is currently being prepared and due to be introduced in 2012, once it has been adopted by the regional assem bly. Whereas policy for protecting and promoting the Breton language depended for many years on voluntarist action led by committed language activists who were in opposition to the linguistic and cultural policies of the state, leadership in language policy is on the cusp of becoming institutionalized, where actions in favor of Breton become increasingly implemented by various levels of govern ment and regional agencies. This current state of Breton language policy, which Lesk (2011) describes as neoinstitutionalist, represents a hybrid of voluntarism and institutional intervention based on education provision and modelling of lin guistic service provision.
Researchers in the 1990s and earlier (for example, McDonald [1989] and Jones [1998] ) found native speakers to be ambivalent about, or even hostile to promoting Breton and unsympathetic to revivalists. This ambivalence of older, traditional speakers is evident in their nontransmission of the language to younger genera tions. Breton was still a majority language in western Brittany in the first half of the 20th century but went into rapid decline after the end of World War II due to a break in intergenerational transmission, which has been well attested in the sociolinguistic literature. The dynamic has continued to the present, as Broudic (2009: 71-76) demonstrates that even the decline in speaker numbers from 1997 to 2007 can be explained by cohort depletion due to deaths, meaning that only small numbers of children have learned the language at home from their parents. The reasons that parents did not speak Breton to their children are complex, as in all language shift situations. In part they may be explained by their desire to encourage their children to speak French well rather than because of any antago nism towards Breton, parents having little awareness of the benefits, or even pos sibility of bringing their children up bilingually in the absence of role models and educational discourse promoting it. To some extent, it might also be attributed to speakers internalizing the national authorities' historical discursive construc tion of Breton as being of the premodern rural past and as an impediment to personal improvement and socioeconomic progress, a phenomenon common to many cases of linguistic minoritization in Europe, identified clearly in the Euro mosaic studies carried out in 1992-1993 (Nelde et al. 1996; Williams 2005 (European Commission 2010 , which included research among fluent Breton speakers (Euromosaic 1999) . The deeply rooted anxiety of parents over the ability of their children to master a minority language at home while also learning a major world language can continue to be transmitted for generations even after changes in the majority opinion have led to a more encouraging environment for the minority language's speakers. Such attitudes are still evident in Ireland's Gaeltacht, for example (Ó hIfearnáin 2007, forthcoming) , despite nearly a century of state sponsored action in favor of Irish at home and school. In the context of Spolsky's tripartite model of language policy (Spolsky 2004) , it is the appropriate management of these popular beliefs about language and the linguistic practices linked to them which constitute effective language policy. Such deeply held be liefs about the value of language work at the subconscious level in minoritized language communities and remain hidden from overt planning initiatives, yet as Shohamy (2006) has emphasized, the way in which they are addressed is the most powerful determiner of a policy's success or failure.
The most comprehensive studies on the numbers of Breton speakers, their socioeconomic profiles and language practices have been carried out by TMO Régions with financial support from the Regional Council and some of the depart ments (départements) in Brittany. The methodologies employed in the first survey in 1997 (Broudic 1999 (Broudic , 2009 ) have been shown to be statistically robust in inde pendent largescale surveying by the national statistics agency INSEE and the census body INED in 1999 (Le Boëtté 2003 . The most recent TMO Régions survey was carried out between 3 and 19 December 2007, with 3,109 informants in all five departments that make up the historic region of Brittany, interviewed by tel ephone. It concluded that 206,000 people could speak Breton either "very well" or "quite well" (Broudic 2009 ). About 89% of the speakers live in western, Lower Brittany (Breizh Izel), home to the traditional speaker community. The very mar ginal presence of Breton in schooling in the past means that nearly all speakers over 40 years old acquired the language from their home or community. In west ern Brittany currently 46% over 75 can speak Breton, 25% in the 60-74 cohort, 10% in the 40-59 group, and 2% in the 20-39 age group. The numbers aged 15-19 who speak Breton (3% of the age cohort or 9,000 individuals) have, however, increased in the last ten years despite 70% saying that neither of their parents could speak the language, doubtless as a result of schooling. At the start of the 2011-2012 school year there were 14,174 pupils attending Breton medium schools or classes (5,995 in state bilingual programs, 4,651 in Catholic Dihun classes and 3,528 in the Diwan association immersion schools). In addition to these, about 8,000 primary and 5,000 secondary school pupils attend Breton classes in the mainstream schools Ofis Publik ar Brezhoneg 2012) .
This evidence sets the background and challenges for language policy initia tives. The overwhelming majority of Breton speakers speak a traditional variety. Establishing an affective and linguistic continuity between new speakers and their nativespeaker elders has been identified as a priority in regional language policy, but to what extent the newly benign sociolinguistic environment can bol ster this is moot. There is now, however, widespread support for proBreton poli cies, with speakers of the language most strongly in favor of policies to maintain and promote it. Support for maintaining Breton was 89% in Lower Brittany, the traditional homeland of the language, while policies to actually promote Breton usage were backed by 76% of Breton speakers and 56% of nonspeakers (Broudic 2009: 149-152) .
This paper draws, in part, on data from a fieldwork project in Lower Brittany and interviews with employees of Ofis ar Brezhoneg / Office de la Langue Bretonne. The field work was undertaken in October 2009. 17 semistructured interviews were carried out individually and in small groups with informants whose pri mary professional work is with the Breton language. All those interviewed were in the age group 29-45 and work as primary or secondary school teachers, as language development agents, in the media or in music and entertainment. All live in the historically Bretonspeaking part of the Côtes d'Armor department, encompassing the southern part of the Trégor region and the northeastern part of Cornouaille. This is one of the most strongly Breton speaking areas in the country. Interviewees were specifically chosen for this paper because they had been brought up speaking Breton themselves in an area where Breton was spoken traditionally, or had learnt Breton from their immediate family and neighbors in childhood. Breton speakers who have such a personal background and who work professionally with the language offer valuable insights into the practice and po tential of language policy, as they are drawn from a group who were involved in the promoting of Breton before the expansion of institutionalized language promotion. Most of the informants make their living directly from state financed activities or from agencies depending on public money, while the entertainment and media professionals rely on the positive profile of the language and culture in the public mind, as well as the many ways in which public funding is used to support performances and artistic creation. Most of the informants themselves described either themselves or their parents as language activists, a movement which has historically positioned itself in opposition to the ideology and actions of the state. All also had higher education in Breton, meaning that they were liter ate in Breton and were sensitized to the oftenposited divide between traditional Breton spoken in rural areas and that of the revival movement (Hornsby 2005 ). This sample is also salient in that their professional profiles correspond to the contemporary image Breton speakers enjoy in the public mind, promoted by the media. Broudic (2009: 88) comments that many of these mediafriendly people are responsible for bilingual schools and evening classes, are publishers and singers, are theatre performers, speak on the radio and appear on television and in the newspapers. They also tend to be urbanbased, although this is not the case in our sample. They are what Spolsky (2004) has called real language planners or managers in that their own practices and beliefs about language influence those of a much wider population with whom they come into contact. Broudic (2009) nevertheless cautions that the most common profile of the Breton speaker which emerged from the 2007 research is most likely an elderly married woman with no formal education, living in a small rural community.
This discussion is also informed by a wide ranging interview on language policy initiatives conducted in October 2010 with Olier ar Mogn, the projects man ager based in Ofis ar Brezhoneg's Rennes office, and by informal meetings on the initiatives which were held with other employees of the agency. Informants in Ofis ar Brezhoneg commented wryly on their role as poachers turned gamekeepers in the continuing "conversation" between language activists and the authori ties, but saw this as further evidence of the increasingly positive public image of Breton among the population and political class, and of the responsibility now being placed by the general public on the Breton language movement. Spolsky (2003) makes the case that policies aimed at societal language mainte nance and reversing language shift can be divided into two broad areas of action. He proposes that "revitalization" is the appropriate term for actions which focus on home language acquisition and usage, notably in educational policy, while "regeneration" is the best term for those which affect wider society, such as of ficial status and the language's profile in the public space. The emphasis in the Regional Council's 2004 policy document is mainly on education within school and increasing provision and access to Breton language learning, and so may be considered to concentrate on the revitalization side. The two types of policy are nevertheless interdependent and rely on each other's success. A core issue identified by all informants in the field work that informs this paper is how links can be made between Breton learners at school and in adult classes, the residual traditional speakers and wider societal usage in domains from which Breton has been absent, or excluded, in the modern period. The role of normal izing, or removing any controversy or ambiguity about the use of spoken Breton outside the home environment and giving it a meaningful visibility in the public space through such areas as signage, official documentation, print and broadcast media presence were seen by all informants as contributing to this goal by reduc ing traditional speakers' hesitancy to use the language with those they do not know while also giving new speakers confidence in their efforts.
Regional language policy

Ofis ar Brezhoneg and the genesis of regional language policy
Ofis ar Brezhoneg, the Breton language agency, was established by the Regional Council with the support of the French Ministry of Culture in 1999 to devise and implement development strategies for Breton in all areas of public and social life. In practice this has meant offering advice and organizing language develop ment and planning initiatives mainly for local government and public services in the first instance. It was originally a notforprofit organization staffed largely by Breton activists. In September 2010 it was reestablished by the State, the Breton and Pays de la Loire regional councils and the five Breton department councils as a public service institution, Ofis Publik ar Brezhoneg / Office Publique de la Langue Bretonne and its staff have in that sense become employees of the state. It played a critical role in creating the Breton Regional Council's language policy by in forming the political debate through its own research and actions and in provid ing focus points for language initiatives. Since it became a publicly owned insti tution, its relationship with the Regional Council, including both its politicians and civil servants, is much closer and it functions to some extent as a the driver of policy initiatives as well as in their implementation. Brezhoneg 2015 called for the enactment of a Breton language policy, which it defined as a public policy in favor of the language (Ofis ar Brezhoneg 2004a: 3). It noted that various actions and schemes aimed at revitalizing Breton were being undertaken by the state, the region, the departments and other local government units but that there was not enough coherence among them nor a distribution of tasks among the different levels of administration that would enhance the posi tive effect of the collective effort. The desire for a centrally coordinated plan was justified by referencing the fact that language planning has been well established and its benefits tangible in many other jurisdictions. The appeal to perceived doubters through citing examples of best practice abroad is a common thread in Breton public policy documents in this period of language policy creation. The proposal was put together and debated at public meetings from early 2003 to 2004 and finally presented three goals and 52 actions to bring them about. The goals were: 1. To stabilize the number of Breton speakers by 2015. 2. Open up new areas of usage for Breton. 3. Improve the quality of Breton being used.
The first goal focused on education, seeking to have 25,000 children in the three bilingual school systems by 2015. Breton medium education is currently avail able to Breton children in three forms of schooling: (a) bilingual classes in public schools (supported by the Div Yezh association), (b) bilingual classes in private Catholic schools (Dihun) and (c) the independent immersion schools (run by the Diwan association). The varying status of these different bilingual programs in the eyes of the French state has often been very fractious (Oakes 2011) . The ratio nale of concentrating on immersion and bilingual schooling was that if 10,000 to 15,000 elderly Breton speakers continue to be lost each year, then these could be counterbalanced by the creation of new speakers through education, even if all those who attend those schools would not reach full fluency. How successful the school system is in producing new speakers is uncertain, and whether or not that is a central part of the ethos of all three systems is not clear either. There is a difference between children acquiring competence in the language and those same children necessarily becoming active speakers outside the classroom as a result of that linguistic competence. Broudic (2010b: 34-38) cites examples from Bretonmedium schools that show that French dominates outside the classroom and in the peer group, and that teachers have to go to lengths to insist on Breton being spoken. Yet, there is ample evidence that many pupils do continue to speak Breton after leaving school. One of the informants in the autumn 2009 fieldwork who had attended Diwan schools from nursery through to high school said that nearly all her classmates, now in their early 30s, continued to speak Breton among themselves and speak it to their children, although she qualified this by saying that some of them spoke Breton with a limited vocabulary and idiom, and had not continued to improve their repertoire or integrate with more traditional speakers since leaving school.
The second goal focused on the expansion of the public use of Breton beyond education and particularly in its visibility in the public space. It emphasizes the promotion of the Ya d'ar Brezhoneg program (discussed in more detail below) in Brittany's municipalities (both rural and urban communes in the French local government system). It also contains actions on the wider use of Breton in the media, the need for more research on place names so that municipalities could use the correct form on their local signage, for bilingual signage on roads which are the responsibility of national authorities and for more open and generalized societal usage.
The third goal aimed to build a positive relationship between traditional and new speakers, and is fundamentally linked to the first goal in that language pro motion in the home and persuading parents to bring up their children in Breton should also be linked to the Breton language spoken by older generations in the locations where they live and by easier access to resources in traditional Breton through collection, publishing and online resources. Preservation of the oral and written linguistic heritage was also seen as fundamental.
The first steps in regional language policy
The 2004 policy document follows Ofis ar Brezhoneg's lead in using cautious lan guage in its opening statements and by justifying its action by reference to lan guage policy developments outside Brittany, couching its proposals in a manner that seeks to counter any worries that the general public, or indeed Paris, might have that developing Breton would be to the detriment of French. It embeds the promotion of Breton and Gallo in the context of bilingualism with a view towards multilingualism and justifies its objectives by referring to international practice in support of cultural diversity and protection of linguistic minorities, citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It also sets the French political context by mentioning the then current (2004) debate on French constitutional reform, which led eventually in 2008 to the insertion of Article 751 of the French Constitution recognizing the "regional languages" as part of France's heritage. This apprehensiveness was necessary, in the views of the fieldwork informants. One of the informants in particular and one of the interviewed employees of Ofis ar Brezhoneg both expressed the view that language policy is a very new concept in public life in Brittany and that a lot of the population, let alone the civil service and political establishment, need to come to terms with its arrival. They also felt that policy drafters had to be very vigilant and not give any possible opponents of language promotion the opportunity to brand the proposals as emanating solely from the opinions of militant Breton nationalists and unconditional supporters of the language revival movement. Indeed, the authors of Brezhoneg 2015 (Ofis ar Brezhoneg 2004a:14-15) recognized that language policy should be informed by sociolinguistic studies but that very little research of that nature was being undertaken in Breton universities, and called for it to become a language policy objective in itself (Goal 1, Action 18). This is not unique to Brittany, of course. Breton languages enthusiasts and activists often point to Welsh, a linguistically related language with which many feel a degree of solidarity, as an example of what could be achieved in Brittany, yet as Coupland and Aldridge (2009: 6) say, while "the tide is flowing in favor of Welsh ethnolinguistic vitality at present, it is also true that language policy makers (including Bwrdd Yr Iaith) and social analysts are operating on the basis of inadequate sociolinguistic and socio psychological data."
The declared policy tries to distance itself from the Breton language move ment by stating that policy must encourage rather than oblige the learning of Breton and that the language belongs to 'the whole Breton population not just to a handful of enthusiasts, whatever their merits may be' (Conseil Régional de Bretagne 2004) . While accepting the necessity to make such a statement for po litical reasons, some of the fieldwork informants found this statement of public ownership and institutionalization mildly offensive, pointing out that everything that had been accomplished for Breton from an educational and status perspec tive prior to the Regional Council's intervention had been achieved by such en thusiasts as individuals or in groups and associations, and that while they never said that the language did not belong to all Bretons, it did not belong to the Re gional Council either.
The region's policy actions are, however, limited by its powers of implemen tation. The Regional Council has consistently called for the transfer of powers for bilingual education planning to the region, reaffirmed by a unanimous vote of the Council in January 2009, but reaching an agreement on structured development of the sector with the French education authorities has been laborious. This coor dination is important for bilingual schooling plans because of the three separate bilingual school systems. Diwan is an independent association and opens schools where there is parental demand, but is restricted by the availability of space and teachers, which in turn depend on subsidies from the Region and central educa tional funding for the teachers' salaries. The private, Catholic Dihun schools are also semidetached from the state system while the bilingual classes supported by Div Yezh exist within schools which are directly under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and its local representative, the Rectorat. Despite efforts at coordinating the provision of schooling among the three systems, especially since 2006, with the aim of having one school serving every 20km radius, relations be tween the Rectorat, the Region and parents and teachers who favor the opening of new bilingual classes in schools have often been strained, as our informants confirmed. They pointed out that two or even three of the models often exist at primary level in the same areas (c.f. map of Breton medium and bilingual primary school provision in 2011, Ofis ar Brezhoneg 2011), and gave many anecdotal ex amples of competition between the state authorities and the Diwan association in particular, expressing the opinion that the Rectorat can tend to ignore local demand for a bilingual class until Diwan or Dihun decide to establish a school in that locality, at which time the Rectorat will move to open a bilingual class in order to undermine them, while demand for bilingual schooling goes unanswered in other areas. An alternative interpretation would be that all three systems are responding to local demand rather than being involved in more farsighted plan ning, which the regional language policy would try to address. Precedent does exist for such practical arrangements in other French regions, for example the agreement between the local representatives of the Ministry of Education and the LanguedocRoussillon region on the teaching of Catalan and Occitan which came into effect in December 2009. The 2010 statutes of Ofis ar Brezhoneg give places on its governing council to representatives of the Rectorat, and our interviewees expressed the hope that the coordination of spatial planning of immersion and bilingual schooling would become a priority so that parents in all parts of Brit tany would have that option.
In its 2004 policy aims, Brittany's regional council had to content itself with "seeking the greatest cooperation among its partners, and especially the five Breton départements, to perpetuate Breton language and culture" (Conseil Régional de Bretagne 2004). To achieve this, it divided its action into three main areas: 1. Passing on the language (concentrating on schooling, family usage, adult learners and publicity campaigns). 2. Developing language usage in social and public life (with emphasis on the media and language plans at local level). 3. Encouraging cultural production (especially in publishing, theatre and song).
These are broadly the same as those suggested in Ofis ar Brezhoneg's earlier Brezhoneg 2015, the "quality of Breton being spoken" and "stabilizing the numbers of speakers" having been amalgamated under the first of the Regional Council's priorities, while it chose to put more emphasis on the public presence of Breton by presenting it as two separate priorities. These are also areas in which the Regional Council had had an established funding role. Some of the implica tions and reactions to the policy priorities in education and the quality of Breton are discussed, drawing on the October 2009 fieldwork in Ó hIfearnáin (2011). This article will look more closely at the support given by the Regional Council and by Ofis ar Brezhoneg to developing the visibility of Breton in the public space, particularly through the Ya d'ar Brezhoneg initiative. (Walsh and McLeod 2008) , but with some important differences in the nature of its founding ideology and implementation. The Irish language schemes are legally required of all public companies named in the Official Languages Act (2003) . These include all bodies which belong directly to the state or which are financed through public money. The principle is one of customer service whereby Irish speakers should be able to make contact with, and expect services from all state institutions and companies, albeit within defined limits. Language schemes are agreed between the public companies and the office of an Coimisinéir Teanga, a language commissioner ap pointed by the President, whose role owes much to the Canadian model. The role of the office of the Coimisinéir is then to monitor the implementation of the agreed schemes and to follow up on any complaints made by members of the public with regard to the working of the schemes and to their language rights more generally. Although this kind of language regeneration project can be seen as cooperative and locally grounded, it draws on the compulsion inherent in the status of Irish as an official language of the state and on the consequent rights of citizens to use it with branches of the state. It has an unmistakable element of topdown planning, an essentially conservative form of language planning which Baldauf (2006: 148-149) describes as "futureoriented systematicchange of language code, use and/ or speaking, most visibly taken by government". There are a number of practical and ideological problems associated with such an approach. Two of the main issues are the inability of many of the state bodies to provide the appropriate level of services due to a lack of personnel with the essential linguistic competence in the necessary areas, and also the lack of a program of "active offer". Despite its official status since the 1920s, the definition of the Gaeltacht and linguistic intervention in it, and the enormous state investment in Irish as both compul sory subject and facultative medium of education, Irish speakers have remained a minoritized group and on the whole do not expect to be able to get services and deal with officialdom in their own language. For language schemes based on cus tomer service to be successful, customers themselves have to be sensitized to the availability of such services and they must be delivered in an unmarked, natural way that does not require the bilingual user to seek out Irish versions of forms or to make extra efforts to do their business in Irish. Despite the robust structure and statutory obligations, the implementation of languages schemes under the Official Languages Act (2003) has not been wholly successful (Walsh 2011 (Walsh , 2012 . Many schemes adopted early in the process have not been renewed and the pace of creating new schemes has slowed, no new scheme being adopted in 2011. Many state companies are thus now without a valid scheme, or never produced one. The Official Languages Act (2003), the role of the Coimisinéir Teanga, the func tions of the government department responsible for the Gaeltacht, the areas of action of Údarás na Gaeltachta (the Gaeltacht development agency), as well as funding for the Irish voluntary sector are all under official review at the time of writing.
Language regeneration policy: Ya d'ar Brezhoneg
In contrast to the model adopted in Ireland and to a degree also in Scotland, Ya d'ar Brezhoneg is a voluntarist scheme in keeping with the nonobligatory ethos espoused by the Regional Council. It seeks to help bodies come up with lan guage plans that are in keeping with their own ambitions and ability to deliver. With such an ideological and practical basis, the program can be extended to the private and voluntary sectors. The current popularity of measures to support Breton in Brittany is in keeping with the contemporary trend in favor of minor ity language protection in much of Europe, among speakers of those languages and nonspeakers alike, observed by Coupland and Aldridge (2009) and Mori arty (2010) among others. As one of our informants said of the program, whereas twenty years ago the municipalities were cleaning off Breton that had been daubed over their signs, they are now putting Breton on everything that can be labeled, and nearly everybody is happy about it -according to this same infor mant, Breton is becoming une langue tendance 'a trendy, fashionable language'.
The program works as a contract between Ofis ar Brezhoneg and the body establishing the plan. In its first phase this was a simple written agreement to use more Breton in the public space within certain defined areas and was aimed pri marily at nongovernmental organizations. The second phase, which launched on 22 December 2004, was much more developed and aimed more specifically at local government, particularly the communes, those urban and rural munici pal administrative units with their elected members, officers and employees that cover the whole country, and also aimed at the newer groupings of rural and urban municipalities. In Ya d'ar Brezhoneg 2 the agreement takes the form of a charter whereby those designing their language plan are offered a catalogue of some 40 possible actions that they can undertake to promote the use of Breton in the public space. They range from basic actions in the first sections, such as the mounting of bilingual place name signs at the entry and exit of the village or town, using bilingual note paper or making a Breton version of the town hall's website to more complex actions such as the erection of Breton or bilingual signs for all streets or rural hamlets, writing Breton editorials in local newssheets, par ticipating in the promotion of language classes for adults or even going as far as making bilingual versions of official forms available, including birth, death and marriage certificates. Several Breton activists interviewed had feared that the in clusion of Breton on official legal documents such as marriage or birth certificates and on voting ballots might cause adverse reaction from the Prefecture, or Minis try of the Interior. It is a sign of the changed view of France's regional languages in circles of central government and authority that the Prefects in Brittany, and in other French regions, have chosen to interpret laws that say documentation must be in French by saying that this does not mean it cannot be provided in other languages as well.
Ofis ar Brezhoneg offers advice on all aspects of these action plans, including placename research and also translation services, for a fee. Once the local coun cil or body making the plan has followed through with it, the situation is verified by Ofis ar Brezhoneg according to freely available criteria, such as whether the Breton and French are equally visible with complete translation and whether the public can see and have access to the Breton versions. In response to the imple mentation of the plan Ofis ar Brezhoneg then gives a "label", a kind of quality assurance for language promotion, which can be awarded at three levels accord ing to whether 5, 10 or 15 of the 40 proposed actions are in operation. A number of the fieldwork informants said that this approach has had a number of very positive effects in that some municipalities see themselves as in competition with their neighbors to achieve a higher grade of label. Olier ar Mogn also believes that the enthusiasm in many communities for the Ya d'ar Brezhoneg label shows that language regeneration projects of this nature have taken root in the popular consciousness because actions at municipal level, even in small rural communes, must be voted upon by the local council and although they may not be costly, and indeed Ofis ar Brezhoneg is keen to highlight those which are cost neutral, imple mentation does require a group effort and support. One of our fieldwork infor mants did point out one of the weaknesses in the system is that as it is voluntary and so much work in Breton still relies on one or two enthusiastic individuals in each local area because the number of productive literate Breton speakers is still quite small, should circumstances change and these people be unavailable, despite group enthusiasm for the project, it might be hard to implement. It is in the provision of structures that enable language promotion to be implemented that Ofis ar Brezhoneg informants see the response to this issue. They believe that in the near future, popular endorsement of such actions will be backed by in stitutional structures so that the plans do not rely on the unflinching resolve of one or two individuals. For the moment, Breton language movement workers and enthusiasts still appear to play a central role in each local area.
As the Ya d'ar Brezhoneg program evolves, more and more local authori ties, companies, associations and individuals have signed up to agreements and charters with Ofis ar Brezhoneg. By September 2011 some 688 businesses, shops, unions, political parties, professional associations, voluntary organizations, medical practitioners, camping sites, leisure centers and museums, education providers from nursery to university, as well as festivals, performing artists, thea tres, broadcast and print media had signed a Ya d'ar Brezhoneg agreement. In addition to these, 147 municipalities and 8 groupings of municipalities had also signed a Ya d'ar Brezhoneg charter and been awarded a label. The scale of the program's success is now becoming a problem for its monitoring and further de velopment as Ofis ar Brezhoneg only has approximately 25 employees in their of fices in Rennes, Nantes, CarhaixPlouguer and Cavan, most of whom are devoted to tasks other than developing Ya d'ar Brezhoneg. All of the informants and Ofis employees were certain that a new method of working will be needed to keep the dynamic, but also saw greater institutionalization as one of the possible out comes whereby provisions such as those in the charter become the norm.
Breton in Upper Brittany
One of the challenges for the language policy pursued by the Regional Council and Ofis ar Brezhoneg is to what extent it can be seen as relevant to parts of Brit tany where there is no residual community of traditional speakers and where Breton may never have been the language of the majority of the community. In these places it can be legitimately asked as to whether the paradigms of revitali zation and regeneration are appropriate, or whether the language project should be understood in a different light.
Brittany is typically described in the sociolinguistic literature as being di vided between historically Breton speaking Lower Brittany in the west and Upper Brittany in the east, home to Gallo, a langue d'hui, linguistically close to standard French. It is difficult to say to what extent Breton was ever the main language east of the line described by Sébillot (1886) (see Figure 1 ), but Loth (1883) , based on placename evidence from the ninth century, considered that at its widest expan sion Breton was spoken by communities close to the Norman border in the north, southwards to near Saint Nazaire, west of Nantes. Sébillot's line seems to reflect quite accurately where Breton still has traditional speakers. Despite rapid decline over most of western Brittany, Timm (1983) found that native Breton was spoken in three quarters of the areas on the line in 1976. The major exception was that if a linguistic frontier is not actually illusory, the city of Vannes should by then have been considered to be outside the traditional Breton heartland. Timm (2009: 716) suggests that her (1976) interpretation of Breton surviving in islands in an ever widening sea of French speakers still holds, but should better be conceptualized less geographically, as social networks or communities of practice. Although the geographic linguistic boundaries have thus been relatively stable for generations, they have always been porous. Olier ar Mogn relates that during fieldwork along the hypothetical linguistic border to determine correct spellings of place names for municipalities that were intending to erect bilingual signage for their Ya d'ar Brezhoneg charter, local native Breton speakers were found in several areas east of Sébillot's 19th century line. Although the social networks and communities of practice remain denser in the traditionally Breton speaking rural west, the nature of urbanization and modern living conditions mean that members of these social networks also live in the east, where there is an established presence of commu nities of Breton practice.
The Regional Council's (2004) language policy also aims to support and de velop Gallo, but Le Coadic (1998) , for example, found that Breton was a more obvious identity marker and target language for learners on both sides of the pos ited linguistic border. Further east, Ar Mogn (2000) says that Breton is not just a heritage issue for children of migrants from Lower Brittany, and points to Breton's tangible urban presence in Upper Brittany, the result of a collective cultural re appropriation of the language that is similar, in his view, to that experienced in contemporary western Brittany's towns and countryside. Promoting Breton is thus a population's investment in a cultural capital that they feel they share with all other Bretons by virtue of being Breton by birth, residence or choice and should not be understood as a case of promoting an ancestral language alone. He points to Breton speaking families in Upper Brittany and to bilingual schools, thousands of adult learners, a media presence, large numbers of students of Breton in the universities and to language associations that have their headquar ters in the regional capital. Revitalization, regeneration and reappropriation of Breton rather than Gallo appear as clearer, more tangible targets to the majority of the population and to policy makers.
Conclusion
Brittany's Regional Council is in the process of formulating a new and more de tailed language policy that will set to build on the foundations laid in the first ten years of this century. However, the capacity to implement the policy is a hin drance. The ambitious targets for the opening of bilingual classes and schools and the enrolments of pupils have not been met, although numbers are increas ing. It has proved difficult to recruit sufficient new teachers to meet the demand (Broudic 2010b) and even the relatively modest number of posts allocated for teacher training and deployment has been undersubscribed. The success of Ya d'ar Brezhoneg has also highlighted that a relatively small number of profession als are being charged with enormous responsibility for language promotion. Ca pacity building in the languagerelated professions is already a major challenge, while the ever present reality of the decline in the numbers of traditional speakers and their communities continues. The fieldwork informants all expressed some anxiety that while Breton was currently fashionable in many circles, a failure of Breton language professionals to meet the general public's expectations could lead to a slide in support over time. They all expressed the belief, however, that Brittany has a core group of language activists that have now kept the language issue to the fore for several generations and that this would not change, no matter what the future of official language policy might bring, clearly articulating a belief that the language activist community and the institutionalization process have not merged to become one body. Nevertheless, the first phases of the institu tionalization of the Breton revitalization and regeneration movement were driven by the enthusiasts, and its current chief agents are drawn from their number. They have skillfully navigated the opportunities that this contemporary liberal western society has afforded them and have laid the foundations for language policies that both are dynamic and have retained the support of the majority of the population. How far language policy can develop further without significant capacity building in the language professions and without significant success in drawing traditional and new speakers together are the main challenges that activists, policy makers and researchers have identified.
